When creating a clip via the Create Clip API, it is VERY limited compared to the (not for public use) GraphQL interface. Requesting that the following enhancements be made to the Create Clip API so that 3rd party apps can leverage them:
1) Add ability to specify the clip start time (number of seconds from when the broadcast started). Reason: when deciding when to create a clip, apps may want to look back 10-15 seconds instead of generating the clip starting from when the API is called.
2) Add ability to specify the clip title. Reason: currently, the API defaults the clip title to the stream title, with no option to change it.

3) Add ability to specify the clip duration (max 60 secs). Reason: current API defaults to 30 seconds with no option to change it.
4) (nice to have) Ability to access raw media MP4 files once created.
5) (nice to have) Ability to specify the clip playback speed (default to 1.0)
6) (nice to have) Ability to specify the clip preview image offset in seconds (default to 0 - start of the clip)

Like Bits transaction, it would be great to allow Channel points to be accessible from an extension.

The idea is to not expose channel points to the extension and work the same way Bits transactions are.

This would also need the addition of channelPointSku or allow sku product to have a bits value and/or a channel Point value.

• User click on a button


• Extension fires window.Twitch.ext.points.usePoints(pointsSku)


• User validate transaction


• (if user complete transaction )OnTransactionCompleted callback is fired with receipt containing channelPoint as the currency used


• (if user cancel or don't have the channel Points) onTransactionCanceled is called

To complete it, adding a filter on the endpoint GET helix/extensions/transactions would allow developers to only get Bits transaction, channel points transaction or both.

Channel points in extensions would help people to discover features, interact with extensions more and at the same time, give a way to regulate the interaction by using channel points instead of free actions.

If I have an oAuth that represents a User, where the User is either

• the broadcaster the clip is of


• an editor of the channel that the clip is of


• the user is the owner of the clip

And I make a request for a Clip as documented: https://dev.twitch.tv/docs/api/reference#get-clips

(but with the bearer naturally)

The JSON Response should include the direct link to the MP4 or an ability to download the Clip.

This is off the back of the removal/deprecation of some undocumented API's that I was using to get the MP4 URL for automated download for creation of clip reels and similar.

Imagine the following attack for the OAuth 2.0 authorization flow:

1. Attacker steals the authorization code from the redirect URI.


2. Attacker forces his instance of the client to redeem the victim's authorization code.


3. If the attacker's instance of the client is faster than the victim's instance of the client in redeeming the authorization code, the attacker will get a valid login session within his instance of the client, but for the victim's account.

This attack should especially get attention in the context of Twitch and live streaming, since many streamers are definitely not aware of this vulnerability: If people are logging in with Twitch on 3rd party sites while live streaming, an attacker that has automated this attacking process (e.g. by capturing the stream) can easily grab the authorization code from the visible browser address bar during the streamer's login attempt, except ...

... the OAuth 2.0 PKCE extension is used by the client, which prevents the attack in the following way:

1. A hashed secret (using a cryptographic hash function) is send using the nonce parameter of the initial authorization request (leading to the Twitch login page).


2. Later, the authorization server (that is used to redeem authorization codes) is sending back the same nonce together with the access token.

The back end implementation (that also securely stores the client secret and makes the call to this authorization server) can now verify whether the nonce sent back from the authorization server is indeed the hashed value of the specific secret.
An attacker that does not know the secret should now longer be able to force the back end to authorize him with the victim's permissions.
Of course, the secret is bound to the authentication session and only visible to an attacker in its hashed form (the nonce) within the initial authentication request.

A few months ago someone suggested to support the OAuth 2.0 authroization flow PKCE extension. [1]
I don't know if the nonce usage above is exactly the same as PKCE, but it at least prevents attack scenarios like the one that I just described.

Currently, the documentation does not mention this nonce parameter being available for the OAuth 2.0 authorization flow. [2] It should be added with a short description, similar to the other optional parameters like state or force_verify to make people aware of it.

This user voice is a clone of this thread in the forum. [3]

[1] https://discuss.dev.twitch.tv/t/pkce-extension-for-oauth-authorization-code-flow/19575
[2] https://dev.twitch.tv/docs/authentication/getting-tokens-oauth#oauth-authorization-code-flow
[3] https://discuss.dev.twitch.tv/t/please-document-optional-oauth-2-0-authorization-flow-parameter-nonce/23357